Wednesday, February 14, 2018

Transitions: Changing World and the Future of Democracy

                                                                                                                      John Samuel
There is a significant shift in the political economy of international power-relations. In an increasingly multi-polar world, many of the ideas and framework that emerged in the post-Second world war era are in a state of flux. The three most important ideas that emerged in the post-Second Wold War period are Democracy, Human Rights and Development. In many ways, Human Rights discourse has also been the universal normative bridge that connected the ideas and ideals of democracy and development.
The broad-framework of international development cooperation and OECD DAC international development assistance model were also broadly in support of democracy, human rights and development. However, with the rise of neo-conservative politics, economic recession in many countries of Europe and with the rise of emerging powers in Asia, Latin America and Africa, there is an increasing sense of crisis to the very ideas of democracy, human rights and development. On the one hand the funding from traditional donors dropped significantly for such work and on the other there is an increasing ‘push-back’ to the very ideas of democracy and human rights. The unprecedented role of corporate funding and money in electoral politics undermined the core of democratic principles. And, increasing prevalence of crony capitalism that thrives on the nexus between economic elites, political elites and bureaucratic elites tend to delegitimize the very idea of human rights in many countries
1) When we study history of ideas and history of the world, there are junctures with paradigm shifts in terms of ideas, institutions and power-networks. A large chunk of ideas, institutional framework and national and international political discourse operational now emerged during the five years from 1945 to 1950. The institutionalization of ideas of 'development' and 'human rights' emerged during this phase. Decolonization emerged during this phase. The United Nations and Bretton Wood institutions too emerged during the phase. So did international development financing and non-governmental organisations. While all these have undergone significant changes in terms of policy and political framework at national and international arenas during 1977-1982, broad political institutional framework survived. The international political framework and dynamics changed significantly from 1989 to 1992, signifying the fall of Soviet Union and the ascent of neo-liberal market ideology.
2) The institutional and ideological framework that operated in the post-second world war is beginning to undergo a change now. While it is a difficult to predict exactly the nature of this change, it is more or less clear that by 2025 there will be significant paradigm shift or reconfiguration of present ideas and institutional framework. Bretton Wood institutions will become increasingly redundant. A significant number of UN agencies will be forced to merge or dissolve in some years to come. If UN itself doesn't go through significant reorganization, the institution will become increasingly redundant.
3) Most of the ideas, ideological framework and analytical models that emerged in the second half of 19th century were applied in practice in the last century. The ideas of 'dialectical materialism', 'adult franchise', democratic social contract, and so on were used or adapted in practice in 20th century across the world, particularly as many countries got out of colonial yoke in the post-second world war era. However, we are getting into a phase where the very same ideas that inspired few generations have become increasingly saturated within the context of institutionalized powerpolitics to control through multiple forms of legitimation and collective consensus.
4) Theold knowledge-analytical and ideological framework is getting brittle and decadent, however, we are yet to come up with new set of ideas or practical knowledge framework that will help to address the issues and challenges of 21st century. Hence, we are moving into a phase of political, social and economic multi-dimensional ambivalence.This predicament of ideological and institutional ambivalence is happening across the world in multiple forms.
5) Markets have encroached everywhere and every aspect of human life, from bedroom to boardroom and from political ideologies to institutional framework. Hence, electoral process itself moved from the legitimacy of an ideological public argument to advertisement based electoral campaigns to 'sell' a set of promises of 'development', 'growth' and 'good governance' in exchange of votes.The poll surveys and media began to negotiate electoral choices, slogans, candidates and the chances of winning and losing. Ideological framework became a veneer of old habits and rhetoric as the predominant fight was to capture power at any cost. This also resulted in the new nexus between economic elites, political party elites and media elites.
6) The media institutionshave become hyper marketised and corporate, their institutional frameworks 'owned' by corporate elites, political elites and religious elites. Journalism has ceased as a profession of public sphere activism and become a vocation of 'professionals' and 'workers' simply bought, sold and controlled by the market-media nexus.As a result the media 'men/women' have became parasites of political and economic elites of a given country. At best they could become 'power-brokers' and 'fixers' or 'sooth sayers' of power-matrix as most of them have lost their sense of autonomy and agency as 'discourse' makers in the public sphere.
7) The saturation of ideas and ideologies of hope and the increasing cynicism that crept within the political party framework has pushed my young people in search of other options and ideas, either at the market place or in terms of new forms of security in the 'old identity' matrices.
8) While the political ideologies of hope and optimism driven and inspired a generation of leaders in the post-second world war era, there are not many ideas or ideological frameworks that inspire the generation of young people now. All this creates a predicament of new ambivalence.
9) As the society and politics get absorbed in the market framework, there are new insecurities among young people. Many people are worried about a well-paid job.Self-worth is not based on the depth of one’s ideas or knowledge, but on skill set that can fetch maximum amount of money in the 'job-market'.Once you get the job, there is new pressure on 'target' and performance 'indicators' and one is always worried about losing a job any moment. One can't afford to lose the job as the entire life gets organised in the form of 'EMI' (equal monthly instalment) for all technology gadgets – car, health-care, housing, student loan etc. This new insecurity and the lack of politics of hope push a large number of young people to new spirituality and tend to get into accentuated sense of religious identity or practices in different parts of the world.
10) Real or perceived social, economic and political inequality creates a social and political environment for reactive politics. In the absence of ides of hope, a significant number of people turn to religious, caste and racial identity as a 'fall-back' option. This creates new 'scepticism' of the 'other' and this 'new othering' creates a sense of social paranoia with political consequences. This created a change in attitude to migrant workers and immigrant communities in many parts of the world. This is evident not only in Brexit but also in the rise of anti-immigrants politics in Europe.
11) It is the beginning of the end of European and then American dominance in the world. However, there will be more flux and ambivalence in the power politics of the world in the next few years. Formations like BRICS are short-term economic-political configurations and traditional regional grouping and institutions themselves are facing new uncertainties.
12) A mix of new insecurities and multiple form of alienations among migrant communities and new forms of social, political and economic insecurities crate environment of 'socio-political' mistrust and consequent violence in society.
13) The increasing instances of dispersed violence and terrorist acts have multiple reasons. While religious identity and 'spiritual' liberation through killing the 'other' and killing oneself have become a trend, it is important to understand it is not only in the name of Islam. The killing of around 87 people by Anders Beverick in Oslo few years ago, or the different forms of shootouts in colleges and schools of the USA are symptoms of new paranoia and alienation among young people.
14) While the rhetoric of democracy has become universal, the real practice of democracy has become increasingly limited. Elections are often used as 'legitimising' mechanism to adopt a more authoritarian regime of elites. The elite capture of the state through the so-called 'democratic electoral process' pose the single largest challenge to democracy
15) The devolution of power to local governance institutions gave more space for citizens to interface with the government. However, it also creates two classes/kinds of political leaders. Most of those who work at the community or grassroots level can only 'dream' of power at the local government institutions of one or other kind. However, the real policy making positions of power go to handpicked candidates with macro-power network in the market, media or political elites. This has also hollowed political parties within as those who work at the grassroots level have less sense of 'agency' or ownership of political decisions or policy choices. This has also led to a new sense of depoliticisation within political parties across the world.
16) There is a need to think fresh and need to consider ideas and ideological options to understand and address the challenges of 21st century. Ideas and political framework that emerged in 19th century in the post-enlightenment Europe may not be capable enough to address the causes and consequences of the predicament of multiple dislocations and ambivalence in the political institutions and framework.
17) Newintellectual searches, theoretical paradigms, new social contract and political praxis will have to evolve in the world and in Asia.
John Samuel

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